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INTRA-COUNTRY REGULATION OF SHARE MARKETS: 
DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
A large body of evidence suggests that financial development is greater in 
countries that impose stricter regulatory requirements on their major stock 
exchanges, but this leaves open the question of whether or not such 
regulation should be uniformly applied to all equity trading platforms within 
a country.  On the one hand, regulatory variation permits a wider choice of 
investment opportunities for investors, lowers the cost of capital for some 
firms, and enhances price discovery and efficiency.  On the other hand, the 
presence of lightly regulated exchanges can potentially have adverse 
spillover implications for a country’s other financial markets. 
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INTRA-COUNTRY REGULATION OF SHARE MARKETS: 
DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In December 2004, the New Zealand Minister of Commerce announced her intention to subject 
share trading platform Unlisted to the provisions of section 36B of the Securities Markets Act, 
effectively placing it on the same regulatory footing as registered stock exchange NZX. Prior 
to this announcement, Unlisted had, for the previous year, provided an unregistered trading 
facility for the securities of firms unable or unwilling to meet the costs and requirements of 
listing on NZX. Trading on Unlisted offered only basic regulatory protection to investors: 
although standard companies and securities provisions applied to Unlisted’s issuers, they were 
not subject to insider trading laws, continuous disclosure requirements, or relevant director 
interest disclosures.  After hearing submissions from interested parties, the government 
ultimately determined that the relevant statutory tests for regulating Unlisted were not 
satisfied.  However, it also served notice that it may revisit the issue if Unlisted is successful in 
attracting significant numbers of companies and investors.  
This episode raises an interesting question that has largely gone unaddressed in the 
academic literature: should all share trading facilities in a given country be required to provide 
similar investor protection coverage, or should variation be allowed?  Such a question has 
become relevant due to organised markets like Unlisted – that are designed to assist the trading 
of unlisted securities – becoming more common. Traditionally, shares that were not listed on a 
major exchange could only be traded via decentralised ‘over-the-counter’ arrangements 
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involving company administrators or private transactions.1  More recently however, centralised 
platforms have arisen to facilitate trading in securities that might otherwise have only been 
available over-the-counter.  Such platforms offer many of the trading facilities offered by 
traditional exchanges, but in some cases are subject to weaker regulation.  For example, in the 
United States, both the OTC Bulletin Board and The Pink Sheets, particularly the latter, face 
fewer regulatory requirements than registered exchanges such as NYSE and NASDAQ.2  
Similarly, in the United Kingdom the LSE operates its more lightly-regulated Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) which has proven attractive to United States and other foreign 
companies seeking the benefits of liquidity without high levels of compliance costs.  Other 
countries, however, such as Australia, impose regulatory standards similar to that required of 
the major exchange.  And standards applied to different markets can vary over time: in the 
United Kingdom, for example, OFEX began life in 1995 as an unregulated trading facility for 
unlisted securities, but subsequently, in 2002, became a prescribed market regulated by the 
Financial Services Authority.3 
Share market regulation thus differs not only across countries, but also, at least in some 
cases, within countries as well.  Inevitably, the presence of intra-country regulatory variation 
has resulted in calls for uniformity, particularly given that traditional exchanges often have a 
vested interest in such a step.  In this paper, we discuss the case for regulatory variation and 
cast a critical eye on the arguments raised for uniformity. To set the scene, we first, in the next 
section, review the inter-country evidence on the relationship between financial regulation and 
market development.  Although this evidence suggests that countries benefit from adopting 
                                                
1  Such arrangements offered little explicit investor protection, largely because participation required considerable 
effort on the part of investors, who were thus assumed to be sophisticated and knowledgeable. 
2  For details on the differences between these markets, see Bushee and Leuz (2005). 
3  The regulatory requirements imposed on OFEX issuers are, nevertheless, arguably weaker than those applied to 
AIM issuers. 
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stringent regulatory standards, other interpretations are possible.  Subsequent sections consider 
the main benefits and costs of allowing, or not allowing, variation in the rules and regulations 
applicable to different equity trading platforms within countries.  
 
2.  Regulation and the development of financial markets 
All major stock markets are subject to regulations that, among other things, specify required 
information disclosure by firms, define restrictions on insider trading, and impose constraints 
on corporate governance choices.4  Traditionally, economists have considered such regulations 
to be largely unnecessary and possibly harmful.5  According to this view, investors analyse and 
process available information to accurately determine firm value, so firms have an incentive to 
disclose information in order to obtain the best price they can for the securities they issue.  
Failure to disclose information, or otherwise behave capriciously, leads to suspicion on the part 
of investors and the attribution of additional risk premia.  Moreover, any difficulties in 
verifying the accuracy of disclosed information can be mitigated by standard legal 
mechanisms.  As a result, regulation at best simply reinforces existing market arrangements; at 
worst it impedes these arrangements and adds to the cost of investment. 
An alternative view holds that share market regulation is beneficial to firms and 
investors.6  The underlying idea is that regulation reduces asymmetric information problems 
and the threat of minority shareholder expropriation, thereby encouraging investors to 
participate in capital markets and thus facilitating the development of these markets.  
Supporting this view, recent research has uncovered a positive correlation between indices of 
                                                
4  For a review of the pros and cons of mandatory disclosure requirements, see Bushee and Leuz (2005); for a  
discussion of the merits of insider trading restrictions, see Bainbridge (2000) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).  
A large number of papers have assessed the effects of the corporate governance provisions in the United States  
Sarbannes-Oxley Act – see, for example, Romano (2005). 
5  See, for example, Stigler (1964). 
6  See Black (2001) for legal discussion, or Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) for economic analysis. 
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investor protection regulation and several metrics of financial market development, including 
market capitalisation, number of listed firms, ownership concentration, liquidity, and cost of 
capital.  The magnitude of these effects, based on La Porta et al (2006) and Hail and Leuz 
(2006), is summarised in Table 1 where we report the average change in these development 
measures as the result of moving from the 10th to the 90th regulatory percentile 
(approximately the difference between Greece and Canada as of December 2000).  Depending 
on the precise measure of investor protection regulation and the empirical method employed, 
such a shift is associated with an increase in the market capitalisation to GDP ratio by between 
0.15 and 0.39, the annual market turnover to GDP ratio by between 0.24 and 0.65, and a 
decrease in the cost of equity capital of up to 3.4 percentage points.        
    
Table 1 Financial market development and regulation   
 
Measures of financial Mean effect of increasing regulation  
Development index from the 10th to the 90th percentile                    
 
Market capitalisation/GDP   15 to 39 percentage points  
 
Firms per capita   28% to 74% 
 
Ownership Concentration   -2 to -13 percentage points 
 
Turnover/GDP   24 to 65 percentage points 
 
Cost of equity    
 all countries  -100 to -340 basis points  
  
 countries with open  0 to -100 basis points 
 capital markets 
 
 
 One interpretation of the evidence reported in Table 1 is that, as La Porta et al (1999, 
p32) put it, "...leaving financial markets alone is not a good way to encourage them."  
According to this view, market trade and growth are facilitated by regulation designed to 
protect investors, and more such regulation is better than less.  This being the case, the 
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existence of share trading platforms that are subject to little or no regulation, even in countries 
that simultaneously offer extensively regulated opportunities on their major stock exchange, is 
of doubtful benefit.  Allowing such platforms discourages investor participation in a 
potentially significant proportion of a country's productive sector and hence retards investment 
and growth; it might also have adverse implications for the health of the regulated stock 
market. 
 One difficulty with this view is that interpretation of the Table 1 evidence is by no 
means unambiguous. While revealing a clear association between financial market 
development and the presence of regulation, it sheds little light on the exact process by which 
this occurs and thus cannot rule out reverse causality.  For example, greater investor 
participation in stock markets may lead to increased demand for regulation that protects such 
investments, i.e., stock market growth 'causes' stronger regulation.  Although Glaeser et al 
(2001) attribute the differing experiences of Poland and the Czech Republic during the 1990s 
to different regulatory systems, other evidence suggests that financial market growth and 
development can precede extensive government regulation and oversight.  For example, 
Franks et al (2005) point out that extensive regulation does not seem to have been a necessary 
condition for the emergence of a flourishing stock market in the United Kingdom during the 
first half of the twentieth century.  In particular, they note that investor protection was rather 
weak during that period, but that the stock market was both large and active.  Moreover, 
greater regulatory protection in the second half of the century had little effect on equity 
issuance or ownership concentration. Similarly, Day (2006) describes how reputational 
considerations were sufficient for the New York stock market to grow and prosper during the 
largely unregulated 19th century.  Finally, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that stock markets 
were, by most measures, more developed in 1913 than in 1980, and that development actually 
went into reverse between 1930 and 1970 – a period characterised by the imposition of 
stronger and more widespread regulation. All three of these studies call into question the 
causative link running from regulation to financial market development. 
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 In the end, it remains unclear whether investor protection regulation causes, or is 
caused by, financial market development.  At best, the evidence in Table 1 indicates that 
regulation assists the development of major, and frequently monopolistic, stock exchanges.  
However, it reveals little about whether or not a given country can benefit from allowing less-
regulated trading platforms to exist alongside traditional exchanges.  Even if the provision of 
tightly regulated investments and trading is in a nation's best interests, it need not follow that 
offering only tightly regulated opportunities is optimal.  Less regulation may indeed allow 
greater expropriation of minority shareholders (see Result 1 of La Porta et al 2002), but some 
investors may nevertheless wish to avail themselves of such opportunities because of the 
potentially attractive rewards they offer, just as some investors are prepared to pay the high 
fees of hedge funds in order to gain access to the promised high returns. We turn to this issue 
in the next section.       
 
3.  Benefits and costs of intra-country variation in the regulation of equity trading 
opportunities 
As is frequently the case in regulatory discussions, it is relatively easy to envisage situations 
where allowing intra-country variation in equity market regulation could potentially have 
adverse consequences, whereas the benefits from doing so are perhaps a little more abstract.    
We first describe these benefits, and then consider the costs of allowing for variation. 
 
3.1 Benefits of intra-country variation in the regulation of equity trading opportunities 
 
There are two principal reasons for allowing variation in the regulatory treatment of organised 
trading platforms. First, it potentially provides firms with access to cheaper financing.  Second, 
it provides investors with a more attractive set of investment opportunities.  We discuss each of 
these in turn.    
 
Firms  
By reducing information asymmetries and the risk of small shareholder expropriation, financial 
market regulation lowers the risk premium that investors require in order to hold a company's 
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securities and hence raises firm value.  But meeting extensive regulatory requirements is not 
costless and for some firms these costs may outweigh the gains from a lower cost of capital.  In 
the absence of a lightly-regulated trading facility, firms face a simple listing choice: incur the 
regulatory costs of listing on a traditional exchange or accept the risk and liquidity premia 
associated with over-the-counter trading and the corresponding lower value of their securities.  
However, as Table 2 summarises, firms that are unable to justify the costs of listing on a 
traditional exchange, and thus would otherwise have opted for over-the-counter trading, 
benefit from the existence of an alternative, less-regulated, trading platform, since the greater 
liquidity of such a platform reduces the risk and liquidity premia to which their securities are 
subject.  As a result, such firms obtain a reduction in their cost of capital without any 
corresponding increase in regulatory costs, thereby increasing their value.7       
 
Table 2 
Trading Platform Costs and Regulatory Coverage 
 
Costs incurred by firms in choosing among the different types of trading 
platform. 
 
Trading Platform  
 
 Traditional Exchange Alternative Centralised Decentralised  
(regulated) (lightly regulated)  (OTC) 
 
 Regulatory costs 
  Risk premium Risk premium 
   Liquidity premium 
  
 
Investors 
Turning to investors, regulation lowers the risk of stock market investment and thus facilitates 
participation by risk averse individuals who might otherwise avoid the market altogether.  But 
some investors may desire the high expected returns associated with lightly regulated firms, 
                                                
7  Giving firms the ability to opt for listing on an organised trading platform without having to incur the costs of  
full regulatory compliance also encourages competitive efficiencies, since it provides traditional exchanges with  
an incentive to minimise the costs of listing and rule compliance – see Rust and Hall (2003). 
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and the diversification opportunities they provide, even though they know that such firms tend 
to be less investor friendly than other firms.  Consequently, if the same level of regulation is 
applied to all stocks traded on organised platforms, such investors may be unable to achieve 
their desired combination of risk and return without incurring increased costs and/or significant 
loss of liquidity.  In the language of modern finance, allowing lightly-regulated trading 
platforms to co-exist with traditional exchanges more effectively completes the market. 
 Although highly risk-averse investors will tend to shun lightly-regulated platforms, 
more risk tolerant investors gain from being able to trade on such platforms, a benefit they 
would lose if all trading facilities were subject to the same rules and regulations.  Thus, 
allowing for variation in regulatory requirements permits an aggregate welfare improvement: 
investors with relatively low risk aversion can be better off under regulatory variation while 
more risk-averse investors are no worse off than they would be under uniform regulation (since 
they can choose not to participate in the lightly regulated platform).8  In short, risk-tolerant 
investors who wish to hold securities that offer only weak regulatory protection are able to do 
so without being forced to accept an illiquid position, and without imposing any costs on more 
risk-averse investors.9 
 Of course, this apparent benefit is subject to a significant caveat: that lightly-regulated 
platforms do not inadvertently attract highly risk-averse investors who, unaware of the risks 
involved, end up placing their funds in 'inappropriate' investments.  This issue often arises in 
debates on deposit insurance for banks, where it is sometimes claimed that small investors are 
ill-equipped to monitor and assess bank soundness (see, for example, Kareken 1990, White 
1995).  Whatever the merits of this view with respect to banks, it seems to have less force 
when applied to equity trading platforms, for at least two reasons.  First, the number of 
affected investors is far smaller, making them less systemically important.  Second, investors 
who participate in less-regulated platforms are sophisticated enough to locate and access what 
                                                
8 Greenstone et al (2006) note that 1964 legislation imposing tougher disclosure requirements 
on United States over-the-counter securities was associated with abnormal excess returns on those securities, 
suggesting that investors valued the stronger requirements, at least initially. 
9  This may not be true if the presence of a lightly-regulated trading platform attracts migration of firms from the 
more heavily-regulated platform, We address this point in more detail later in this section. 
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are typically low-profile markets, so it seems unlikely that many of them are also sufficiently 
naïve and ill-informed to require protection from the consequences of their investment 
decisions.10  
Efficient allocation of capital requires that investments be priced commensurate with 
the risks they carry, so a more sophisticated version of the ‘investor protection’ caveat revolves 
around whether or not investors who trade on the lightly-regulated platforms are able to 
correctly price the risks involved and thus receive adequate ex-ante compensation.  If this is 
not the case, then the resulting resource misallocation may significantly reduce the benefits of 
allowing lightly-regulated investment opportunities.  However, investors do seem able to 
rationally price the kinds of risks that are typical of securities that trade on less-regulated 
platforms.  For example, Kerins et al (2004) report that expected returns on high-technology 
IPOs are much greater than on traditional stock portfolios, while Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
find that United States investors require a higher expected return on illiquid stocks.  
 
3.2  Costs of intra-country variation in the regulation of equity trading opportunities 
 
The primary reason for not allowing intra-country variation in regulation is the 
existence of so-called spillover effects.  These refer to negative externalities that the operations 
of a lightly regulated trading platform may impose on other markets (such as a traditional 
exchange), thus inhibiting overall financial development. There are three main routes by which 
such spillovers might occur.  
 
Race to the bottom 
If firms opt to migrate from the tightly-regulated traditional exchange platform to a lightly-
regulated trading facility, then risk-averse investors who desire regulated investment 
opportunities may be forced to choose a sub-optimal securities portfolio, thereby undermining 
the beneficial effects of regulation.  Moreover, the potential for such migration may induce a 
                                                
10 Additional steps are sometimes taken to segregate investors and investments.  For example, should naïve 
investors inadvertently attempt to access Unlisted’s website, they must first declare that they have read and 
understood a prominent disclaimer regarding the company’s regulatory status before they can proceed any further. 
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‘race to the bottom’ in terms of listing standards, further restricting the choices available to 
investors. 
  However, both theory and evidence suggest that these concerns can be over-stated.  
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) show that reputational concerns discipline a market’s choice 
of listing standards and, therefore, that the most likely outcome is an endogenous segmentation 
of trading platforms: heavily regulated, high-reputation traditional exchanges coexist with 
lightly regulated, low reputation alternative trading facilities.  Indeed, as these authors point 
out (p483), adoption of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach “…may affect the economic viability of 
value-maximizing exchanges, since in order to survive, (these exchanges) need the flexibility 
to optimally tailor their listing standards to their pool of applicant firms, with the quality of this 
pool varying as a result of competitive pressures from other exchanges.”      
Consistent with this prediction, the emergence of alternative trading platforms has not 
been associated with any weakening of listing standards on major exchanges.  Indeed, firms 
seem to much prefer the greater visibility and liquidity of listing on a traditional exchange and 
choose alternative platforms only if they have no viable alternative, or if they wish to avoid 
outside monitoring and it is cost-efficient to do so (see Leuz et al, 2007).  For larger firms in 
particular, the lower cost of capital attainable from listing on a traditional and regulated 
exchange far outweighs the costs from having to comply with greater regulatory requirements.  
 
Contagion 
A second source of spillover costs might come from investors in a regulated market reacting 
negatively to an adverse event on a less regulated market – the so-called contagion effect.  In 
this scenario, the collapse of a firm on the less regulated market causes investors to also lose 
confidence in the more regulated market, prompting a rash of selling in the shares of healthy 
firms.   
There are several reasons to be cautious about this argument.  First, while contagion is 
a much-feared and discussed theoretical phenomenon, financial markets seem to be fairly 
resilient in practice, even to within-market shocks. It is not uncommon for a listed firm to fail, 
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yet this rarely has any lasting effect on the overall health of the market on which its securities 
were traded. But if the collapse of an individual firm does not trigger problems in its own 
market, it seems unlikely that it would have any significant effect on another, more tightly-
regulated, market.  Indeed, as Longstaff (2004) shows, to the extent that a loss of confidence in 
a lightly regulated market induces a flight to quality and/or liquidity, a heavily regulated 
trading platform can actually benefit from difficulties in a less regulated market.  
Second, where cross-market collapses have occurred, Kaminsky et al (2003) note that 
these have typically been precipitated not by the collapse of a single firm, but rather by 
significant macroeconomic shocks (such as government defaults or exchange rate 
depreciations).  This point seems particularly salient to within-country contagion: firms listed 
on platforms other than the traditional exchange are almost always relatively small and 
economically insignificant, and so are most unlikely to have any impact on the broader market.   
Third, Kodres and Pritsker (2002) show that difficulties in a market characterised by 
significant information asymmetries are far more likely to flow through to other low-
information securities than to those that trade in markets where information problems are 
weaker.  In other words, although the failure of one or more firms listed on a lightly-regulated 
trading platform can, in certain circumstances, have adverse implications for other lightly-
regulated platforms (or for other securities traded on the same platform), there is little chance 
of problems arising on a more heavily-regulated traditional exchange.  
Finally, the contagion argument also seems inconsistent with the principal rationale for 
regulation of financial markets: that, as seen in Table 1, investors rationally require 
compensation to induce them to participate in markets with weak regulation, thereby inhibiting 
the development of these markets.  Contagion, on the other hand, requires that investors 
irrationally discount the price of shares traded on traditional exchanges.  In other words, 
investors are rational enough to correctly price the benefits of regulation, but not rational 
enough to ignore irrelevant events for regulator-protected securities. 
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Confusion        
A third possible problem with platform-specific regulation is that it may cause confusion in the 
minds of investors, particularly offshore investors, about the regulatory status of any particular 
security, thereby discouraging them from participating in even heavily-regulated markets.  As 
a result, the country's financial development is retarded, with resulting negative implications 
for investment and growth.  In short, according to this view, diversity in regulation creates 
adverse selection problems for offshore investors, causing them to assume the worst about all 
securities regardless of the actual regulatory protection afforded any particular security.11   
 Although this issue has received scant attention in the literature, the little evidence that 
exists is not very supportive of the ‘confusion’ argument.  One way to see this is to note that if 
a possible lack of sufficient investor protection (because of confusion created by intra-country 
regulatory heterogeneity) is sufficient to reduce foreign participation in a country's capital 
markets, then an actual lack of investor protection must certainly do so.  Thus, a minimum 
implication of the 'confusion' argument is that offshore investors should invest less in the 
markets of countries with weaker regulation.  However, after controlling for information 
transparency, Gelos and Wei (2005) report a significantly negative relationship between 
mutual fund investment in emerging countries and shareholder protection in those countries. 
 To take this idea a step further, we investigate the relationship between foreign 
ownership of a country's major stock market and the regulatory protection provided in that 
market.  If regulatory variations do induce shifts in the quantity of investment, then we should 
observe a positive relationship between these two variables.  For this analysis, we use data 
from two sources.  First, as a measure of foreign ownership, we use the information on U.S. 
investors' 1997 foreign stock holdings (as a percentage of shares readily available for trading) 
reported in Leuz et al (2005).  Second, as measures of regulatory coverage, we use two indexes 
described in Hail and Leuz (2006).  DISREQ is a an index (ranging from 0 to 1) of the level of 
mandatory disclosure requirements in each country; SECREG is a broader index (ranging from 
                                                
11  Foreign investors might suffer disproportionately from information problems because local investors are, or  
can more easily be, better informed about local firms' governance, management and prospects.  See Leuz et al  
(2005).  
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0 to 1) of the level of mandatory disclosure requirements and the strength of private and public 
enforcement institutions in each country.  To determine whether regulatory protection is 
important for stock market participation, we regress US foreign stock holdings on each of the 
two regulation variables. 
 
 
Table 3 Regressions of US Portfolio Investment on Investor Protection 
Regulation 
 
The dependent variable is 1997 US investor holdings of each of 27 foreign 
country stock markets as a percentage of shares readily available for 
trading; data are available in Leuz et al (2005).  DISREQ is an index 
(ranging from 0 to 1) of the level of mandatory disclosure requirements; 
SECREG is an index (ranging from 0 to 1) of the level of mandatory 
disclosure requirements and the strength of private and public enforcement 
institutions.  Both regulation indexes come from Hail and Leuz (2006).  
Size is the mean value (in USD million) of total assets for firms in each 
country. t-statistics based on OLS regressions are in parentheses; * (**) 
denotes significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
 
Independent  
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Intercept  23.0  17.27  14.6  6.5 
   (3.5)** (2.5)*  (1.8)  (0.8) 
 
DISREQ  -17.2    -10.0 
   (1.7)     (0.9) 
 
SECREG    -9.8    1.3 
     (0.8)    (0.1) 
 
Size      0.01  0.01 
       (1.6)  (2.0)* 
 
 
R2   0.10  0.02  0.19  0.16 
 
 
 
The results of this exercise appear in Table 3.  Models (1) and (2) find no significant 
relationship between US demand and foreign stock market regulation; indeed, what 
relationship there is goes in the wrong direction.  If anything, therefore, investors seem to 
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desire greater risk with their offshore investments, possibly because this offers greater 
diversification benefits with their domestic holdings.  In models (3) and (4), we also include 
average firm size as a control variable in case US investors have a tendency to invest relatively 
more in bigger markets, but the regulation variables remain economically and statistically 
insignificant. 
 The absence of controls for other factors that may affect US investor demand means 
that the results of this analysis need to be interpreted with caution.  Nevertheless, the failure to 
observe any significant bivariate correlation between US investor demand and regulatory 
indexes, together with the similar findings of Gelos and Wei (2005), at a minimum suggests 
that variation in regulatory protection does not affect foreign investor demand in a simple 
manner.  
Finally, Kelly and Woidtke (2005) find that direct foreign investment by multinational 
firms is greatest in countries with weak regulation.  As they point out, this evidence suggests 
that market mechanisms can mitigate potentially-adverse effects of limited investor protection, 
a view supported by Table 3.  
 
4.  Dynamic and unintended consequences of adopting a 'one-size-fits-all' intra-country 
approach 
The emergence of alternative trading platforms has seen, as the Unlisted case illustrates, calls 
for these platforms to be regulated in the same way as traditional registered exchanges. 
Suppose one starts from a position where a traditional exchange exists side-by-side with a less-
regulated trading platform.  An issue that is not addressed anywhere above, but which is 
nevertheless important, is as follows: what is the appropriate test for determining whether the 
alternative platform should be subject to the same level of regulation as the traditional 
exchange?  That is, how should the pros and cons outlined in previous sections be balanced 
against each other? 
 Traditional cost-benefit analysis requires only that the expected benefits of doing so 
exceed the expected costs.  However, legislation is typically much easier to pass than to repeal, 
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so even regulation that quickly reveals obvious harm is likely to stay in place for some time.  
In other words, regulation is at least partially irreversible.  By analogy with the irreversible 
investment literature (see, for example, Dixit and Pindyck 1994), such a phenomenon can have 
significant implications for the appropriate test.12 
 To formalise this idea, we can think of the regulator as having the perpetual right to 
subject all centralised trading platforms to the same regulation.  At each date, the regulator 
observes the present value B of a stream of future expected benefits (e.g., less investor 
confusion and lower potential for harmful contagion) from uniform regulation and the present 
value C of a stream of future expected costs (e.g., less choice for investors and firms, and less 
competition among trading platforms).  At any time, the regulator can choose to impose 
uniform regulation, thereby generating the net social payoff (B-C).  As we show in the 
appendix, such a step is justified if and only if 
 
  B ≥ λC         
 
where λ > 1 represents a waiting premium.  To the extent the regulation is irreversible, there is 
value in waiting to acquire more information about the uncertain benefits of proceeding.  As a 
result, the estimated benefits of regulating must not just exceed costs, but must do so by a 
factor reflecting the additional indirect costs of irreversibility. The more uncertain the benefits, 
the greater the value of exercising regulatory caution.  
 The important insight of this result is that dynamic effects resulting from the imposition 
of uniform regulation must also be taken into consideration. Unless the estimated benefits of 
uniform regulation are clearly, and significantly, greater than the costs, then restraint is 
justified.  Indeed, the above test potentially understates the necessary caution insofar as it 
implicitly assumes the initial existence of an alternative trading platform.  Because innovation 
and investment in such platforms is also irreversible, the risk of future regulatory intervention 
can discourage their development in the first place.  The imposition of uniform regulation thus 
                                                
12 See Parisi et al (2004) for a detailed discussion of the relevance of this principle to legislation in general.  
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makes it less likely that alternative platforms will arise in the future even if the regulation is 
repealed, a dynamic consideration that effectively raises λ further.  
  Even ignoring these dynamic consequences, attempts to impose uniform regulation on 
equity trading platforms have the usual potential for unintended consequences. A common 
justification for regulatory convergence is that it provides better protection for small investors.  
As discussed in the previous section, the protection of individual investors is not in and of itself 
a sufficient reason for regulatory intervention.  However, even if there were some systemic, 
and therefore compelling, reasons for protecting small investors, it is by no means clear that 
imposing a uniform standard of regulation will assist in achieving this goal.  Implicit in the 
argument that regulatory convergence is useful is the assumption that firms that currently list 
on an alternative platform will choose to remain on that platform once it is subject to full 
regulatory coverage, rather than revert to over-the-counter trading – which is largely 
unregulated, inhibits price discovery, and provides even less protection to small investors. The 
existing evidence suggests a degree of pessimism about this assumption.  Bushee and Leuz 
(2005) report that 2677 firms (almost 50% of the total) were removed from the OTC Bulletin 
Board following the adoption of stricter disclosure requirements in 1999, while Leuz et al 
(2007) and Marosi and Massoud (2007) find that the number of firms voluntarily deregistering 
from major United States exchanges increased significantly following the introduction of 
stronger regulatory requirements in 2000-2002.  As Bushee and Leuz (p.235) put it, it seems 
that "an important consequence of (stronger regulation) is to push smaller firms with lower 
outside financing needs into a less regulated market, rather than to compel them to adopt 
higher disclosure standards." 
 Even to the extent that firms do remain on an organised trading platform, this may not 
have the desired impact on overall financial development. As the model of Danielsson and 
Zigrand (2007) demonstrates, investors with an appetite for lightly regulated securities may 
simply quit the country altogether, leaving other investors to hold riskier portfolios than they 
would otherwise have chosen.  To induce them to do so, these investors must be offered a 
higher expected rate of return, thereby increasing the firms' cost of capital and negating the 
benefits expected from more stringent regulation.       
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5.  Concluding remarks 
Considerable evidence exists to suggest that investor protection regulation assists the 
development of a country's traditional, and frequently monopolistic, stock exchange.  
However, giving firms the option to list on alternative trading platforms that are subject to 
lighter regulation may confer additional benefits: investors can access a wider range of 
investment opportunities without foregoing significant liquidity, firms can lower their cost of 
capital without incurring significant regulatory costs, and traditional exchanges are subject to 
competitive discipline. 
 Such benefits could turn out to be illusory if the existence of less-regulated platforms 
imposes negative externalities on a country's major exchange.  However, the proposed 
mechanisms by which such spillover effects might occur are not particularly convincing, and 
currently lack empirical support.   
 Of course, the relatively short history of alternative trading platforms means that many 
of their implications and consequences remain to be fully explored, and research of this kind 
may ultimately identify significant spillover mechanisms or suggest other plausible reasons for 
subjecting these platforms to the same level of regulation as traditional exchanges.  Until such 
evidence becomes available, however, calls for uniformity of regulation should be treated with 
a degree of scepticism.             
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Appendix: Determining the appropriate test for the imposition of uniform regulation   
 
The value B of the future expected benefits stream is uncertain and evolves according to the 
geometric brownian motion process 
 
  dB = µB dt + σB dξ       (A1) 
 
where µ and σ are constant parameters and dξ is a Wiener process.  To keep things as simple 
as possible without losing anything essential, we assume the value C of the future expected 
costs stream is fixed.   
 The regulator has a perpetual option on the payoff (B-C).  Let the value of this option 
be denoted by F(B; B*), where B* is the optimal stopping value, i.e., the value of B at which 
uniform regulation is justified.  The Bellman optimality principle implies 
 
  E[dF] = ρFdt        (A2) 
 
where ρ is a discount rate.  Applying Ito's Lemma to F and using (A1), equation (A2) can be 
written as 
 
   12  σ2B2 F'' + (ρ - δ)VF' - ρF  =  0 
 
where δ = (µ - ρ).  Solving this differential equation yields 
 
  F(B; B*) =  (B* - C) ( B B* )γ    
 
where  
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  γ = ( 12   -  r - δσ2   ) + 2rσ2  +  (12  - r - δσ2 )2   > 1 
 
Maximising F in the usual way then provides the solution for B*: 
 
  B* =  λC 
 
where λ ≡ γγ - 1   > 1        || 
 
